

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09038 01 OF 03 231705Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00 ACDE-00 PRS-01
NEA-10 L-03 NSCE-00 OES-07 AF-10 /087 W
-----060938 231805Z /44

R 231440Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9041

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 9038

DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC, ACDA, DOD, JCS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, XO, UR
SUBJECT: INDIAN OCEAN ARMS CONTROL: OPENING US STATEMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE OPENING STATEMENT DELIVERED
BY AMBASSADOR WARNKE AT THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING ON
INDIAN OCEAN ARMS CONTROL, 10:30 A.M. JUNE 22, 1977.

2. MR. AMBASSADOR, I AM PLEASED TO TAKE PART WITH
YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF YOUR DELEGATION IN THESE
EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE INDIAN OCEAN.
ON BEHALF OF MY DELEGATION I THANK YOU FOR PROVIDING
SUCH EXCELLENT FACILITIES FOR OUR MEETING.

3. I WOULD LIKE TO SET FORTH OUR IDEAS OF WHAT THE
AIMS OF THESE MEETINGS SHOULD BE. FOR MANY YEARS
NOW THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN
TALKING TOGETHER ABOUT WAYS TO CURB ARMS COMPETITION.
THE COMMON SEARCH FOR AREAS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON
HOW TO MAKE THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE TO LIVE IS THE
CORE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND A MAJOR FACTOR
IN REDUCING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. WHEN SECRETARY
OF STATE VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO MET HERE IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09038 01 OF 03 231705Z

MOSCOW LAST MARCH, THEY AGREED TO CONDUCT FURTHER ARMS
CONTROL DISCUSSIONS IN EIGHT AREAS. DELEGATIONS FROM
OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY MET TO DISCUSS
RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, A COMPREHENSIVE
NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. I AM
PLEASED THAT TODAY WE ARE NOW READY TO BEGIN OUR
DISCUSSIONS ON POSSIBLE ARMS LIMITATIONS IN THE

INDIAN OCEAN.

4. THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED THE FORMATION OF A JOINT WORKING GROUP ON ARMS LIMITATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN BECAUSE, AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT MR. AMBASSADOR, AS THE WORLD'S TWO LEADING POWERS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING GLOBAL PEACE AND AVOIDING AN ESCALATING ARMS COMPETITION. OUR OFFICIALS FIRST TALKED ABOUT A BILATERAL EFFORT TO AVOID MAJOR POWER COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN BACK IN 1971, BUT NOT UNTIL THIS MEETING TODAY WAS ARRANGED HAVE WE HAD A FORUM FOR A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

5. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO DEPLOY VERY LARGE MILITARY FORCES INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN. HOWEVER, NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTLY MAINTAINS OR DEPLOYS LARGE MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA. AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT, WE HAVE NOT GONE TOO FAR TO PRECLUDE RESTRAINT AND WE THUS HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THE AVOIDANCE OF MAJOR MILITARY COMPETITION.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD USE THIS FIRST MEETING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09038 01 OF 03 231705Z

TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN ESTABLISH A PROCESS LEADING TO ARMS LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE AIMED AT STABILIZING THE PRESENT LEVEL OF OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY PRESENCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WITH AN UNDERTAKING NOT TO INCREASE THEM. IF WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE, WE CAN THEN CARRY THE PROCESS FURTHER TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS IN OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY PRESENCES, WHICH WOULD STABILIZE THE SITUATION AT LOWER LEVELS.

7. AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO LIMIT THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE GLOBAL RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. IT WOULD ALSO HELP BOTH SIDES AVOID A WASTEFUL MILITARY COMPETITION AND THE EMERGENCE OF A POSSIBLE IRRITANT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09038 02 OF 03 231656Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00 ACDE-00 PRS-01
NEA-10 L-03 NSCE-00 OES-07 AF-10 /087 W
-----060799 231804Z /44

R 231440Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9042

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 9038

DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC, ACDA, DOD, JCS

8. I WOULD LIKE NOW TO DISCRIBE OUR OWN MIITARY PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE US HAS BEEN FOLLOWING A POLICY OF RESTRAINT IN THE INTEREST OF STABILITY IN THAT REGION. OUR ONLY CONTINUOUS NAVAL PRESENCE THERE HAS BEEN THE US MIDDLE EAST FORCE (MIDEASTFOR), WHICH HAS BEEN STATIONED IN THE INDIAN OCEAN SINCE 1949 AND WHICH CURRENTLY CONSISTS OF A FLAGSHIP AND TWO FRIGATES. WE ALSO PERIODICALLY DEPLOY OTHER NAVAL FORCES TO THE INDIAN OCEAN TO INDICATE OUR INTEREST IN THE AREA AND TO PROVIDE FAMILIARIZATION WITH OPERATING CONDITIONS THERE. WE ALSO CONDUCT FLIGHTS OVER INDIAN OCEAN WATERS FOR THE SAME REASONS. TO SUPPORT THESE LIMITED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE UNITED STATES USES EXISTING FACILITIES IN SEVERAL LITTORAL COUNTRIES. WE HAVE ALSO CONSTRUCTED MINIMAL FACILITIES ON THE BRITISH-OWNED ISLAND OF DIEGO GARCIA TO SUPPORT SMALL-SCALE NAVAL AND COMMUNICATIONS AND OCEAN SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

9. IN SHORT, WE ARE AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN NO ARMS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09038 02 OF 03 231656Z

COMPETION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH THE SOVIET

UNION. THE MILITARY FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE AREA BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. WHAT THE US SEEKS IS AGREEMENT TO STABILIZE OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY PRESENCES IN THE AREA, AND THEN IF POSSIBLE TO SCALE THEM DOWN IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A COSTLY COMPETITION MIGHT DEVELOP.

10. WE BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN COINCIDE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. WE BOTH DESIRE UNRESTRICTED COMMERCIAL ACCESS TO THE AREA AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE INDIAN OCEAN FOR SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS. YOU STRESSED THIS POINT IN YOUR OPENING REMARKS. WE BOTH SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN ENCOURAGING THE LITTORAL NATIONS TO DEVELOP AS THEY SEE FIT, WITHOUT SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION AND COMPETION. MOST IMPORTANTLY FOR THE IMMEDIATE WORK OF THIS GROUP, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ASSURING THAT WE AVOID A DESTABILIZING BILATERAL MILITARY COMPETION THAT WOULD BENEFIT NEITHER OF US. WE THEREFORE SEE THE MAIN TASKS OF THE PROCESS WE ARE BEGINNING TO BE THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL, REALISTIC MEASURES BY WHICH WE MAY LIMIT OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ON A MUTUAL BASIS.

11. AWLE PRECEDENT EXISTS FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS. OUR COUNTRIES HAVE HAD A SATISFACTORY EXPERIENCE IN THE OTHER BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN US CONCERNING STRATEGIC FORCES AND NAVAL FORCES -- A SUBJECT SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH WE ARE DISCUSSING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09038 02 OF 03 231656Z

TODAY. I REFER, OF COURSE, IN THE LATTER INSTANCE TO THE AGREEMENT FOR THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS ON AN OVER THE HIGH SEAS AND THE ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL, WHICH WERE SIGNED IN 1972 AND 1973 RESPECTIVELY. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THESE MEETINGS WILL BE AS PRODUCTIVE AS THE MEETINGS THAT LED TO THAT AGREEMENT. THIS, MR. AMBASSADOR, IS AN OUTLINE OF OUR AIMS.

12. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSION OF AIMS, WE SUGGEST THAT THE AGENDA INCLUDE A STATEMENT BY EACH SIDE ON THE APPROACH OR FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE OUR DISCUSSION OF INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS. WE MIGHT THEN PROCEED TO A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE ELEMENTS THAT COULD BE COVERED IN AN AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE: A DEFINITION OF THE AREA,

RESTRICTIONS ON NAVAL SHIP DEPLOYMENTS AND ON USE
OF FACILITIES FOR THE SUPPORT OF NAVAL SHIPS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09038 03 OF 03 231728Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00 ACDE-00 PRS-01
NEA-10 L-03 NSCE-00 OES-07 AF-10 /087 W
-----061289 231804Z /44

R 231440Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9043

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 9038

DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC, ACDA, DOD, JCS

13. I WOULD LIKE TO SET FORTH OUR VIEWS ON A
FRAMEWORK WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD FACILITATE
SERIOUS, MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS AND WOULD THEREBY
PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF
LIMITING AND, OVER TIME, REDUCING UNITED STATES
AND SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

14. FIRST, THESE TALKS AND THEIR OBJECTIVES ARE,
OF COURSE, BILATERAL IN NATURE. THE CONTINUING
RELATIONSHIP OF DETENTE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES
PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE FOR THIS BILATERAL FRAMEWORK.
AS I POINTED OUT PREVIOUSLY, PRECEDENT EXISTS FOR
TWO-PARTY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION ON MATTERS CONCERNING THE
OCEAN.

15. SECOND, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS
SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL IN NATURE. IN OUR
PRIVATE COMMENTS, BOTH OF US RECOGNIZED THIS
POSITION. BOTH OUR COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE
ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED FROM CONFIDENTIALITY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09038 03 OF 03 231728Z

IN FACILITATING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND IN AVOIDING CONCERN THAT EITHER SIDE MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO GAIN POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER. THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN THAT EITHER SIDE WOULD BE PREVENTED FROM CONSULTING PRIVATELY WITH ITS ALLIES AND OTHER CONCERNED NATIONS WHICH HAVE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN THE AREA.

16. THIRD, WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR ACTIONS SHOULD NOT LIMIT THE RIGHTS OF THE US OR THE SOVIET UNION TO COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME ACCESS TO THE DIRECT TRANSIT THROUGH THE INDIAN OCEAN. EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAS A LONG HISTORY OF EXTENSIVE COMMERCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WHICH SERVE THE PEACEFUL INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND THOSE WHO BORDER ON THE INDIAN OCEAN. THEREFORE, IT REMAINS IMPORTANT THAT WE ASSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES WHICH PROMOTE THE WELL-BEING OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA.

17. FOURTH, MR. AMBASSADOR, AS YOU POINTED OUT IN YOUR STATEMENT, ANY ARMS CONTROL ARRANGMENT MUST NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EITHER PARTY OR OF OTHER STATES.

18. THERE IS MUCH THAT IS COMMON IN OUR TWO STATEMENTS. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A FOREIGN BASE. A DISCUSSION OF WHO CONTROLS A BASE WOULD NOT BE VERY FRUITFUL. WE WOULD HAVE TO DEFINE WHAT A BASE AND WHAT A SUPPORT FACILITY IS. WE MUST FOCUS OUR

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09038 03 OF 03 231728Z

ATTENTION ON THE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE ALSO HAVE TO FOCUS OUR ATTENTION ON THE APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM AND DEFINE ACTIVITIES WHICH TAKE PLACE IN THAT AREA. THE US HAS A SMALL SCALE FACILITY AT DIEGO GARCIA TO SUPPORT A LIMITED LEVEL OF ACTIVITY. WHAT YOU HAVE ACCESS TO AT BERBERA IS A LEAST EQUIVALENT TO THIS. OUR TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ARE PEACEFUL IN NATURE. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY FORCES, AND WORK TOWARD SETTING LIMITS ON LEVELS AND KINDS OF MILITARY PRESENCE.

19. IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE TWO STATEMENTS THAT WE
DO HAVE SEVERE DIFFERENCES IN SEVERAL AREAS.
DURING OUR TALKS THIS WEEK WE CAN TRY TO FIND OUT
WHICH ONES ARE SEMANTIC, AND PERHAPS AGREE ON A
FRAMEWORK FOR ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THOSE WHICH
ARE NOT. BUT I AM ALSO PLEASED TO NOTE YOUR
ENTHUSIASM AND WILL TO TACKLE AND TO SOLVE THESE
COMPLEX PROBLEMS. THANK YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR.
TOON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: OCEANS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, SPEECHES, MEETING DELEGATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 23-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MOSCOW09038
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770225-0063
Format: TEL
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770624/aaaaaayk.tel
Line Count: 342
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 32efce77-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2050850
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INDIAN OCEAN ARMS CONTROL: OPENING US STATEMENT
TAGS: PARM, XO, UR, US, (WARNKE, PAUL C)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/32efce77-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009